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Abstract
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) has long served as a foundation in
macroeconomic laws of motion. However, the assumptions of REH are likely too
powerful to be representative of economic actors. This research evaluates adaptive
learning, a developing alternative to rational expectations, using a multi-agent
macroeconomic prediction “game.” Data was gathered from a group of students, each
predicting the outcome of a single economy over time. Each agent was asked to
forecast output (GDP) and inflation in each period based on historic levels of output,
inflation, and interest rates. These data were then analyzed under various theoretical
models of adaptive learning for mathematical fit.
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1

Introduction

Economics has long recognized and attempted to quantify the phenomena of forward
thought. Known as “expectations” in literature, has become an essential component of
macroeconomic laws of motion, the dynamic mathematical systems by which macroeconomies are modeled. Researchers recognize that awareness of the future impacts how
individuals make economic decisions, but have yet to determine a way to accurately
portray these decisions in models. Historically, several methods have been used to
approximate expectations’ impact on the macroeconomy. Originally, naı̈ve expectations were used as a simple stand-in for awareness of expectations, and the Rational
Expectation Hypothesis was later developed to capture more nuanced subjects. The
history and descriptions of both of these methods will be presented, as well a brief
introduction to adaptive learning, the expectation formation method at the center of
this paper. Additionally, this introduction will discuss how central banks may attempt
to improve knowledge within a learning model through central bank communication.
“Naı̈ve” expectations were the original representation of an agents consideration of
future economic conditions. It can be described as follows:

xe(t+1) = xt
where xt is economic output in the tth time period. The superscripted term, xe(t+1)
represents the expected value of growth in the following time period. While this assumption captures an awareness of the future, it is too weak to accurately model the
complexity of human inductive reasoning, as economic agents are able to recognize
that tomorrow’s growth may bring different outcomes than did today’s. Then, following the work of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1967), the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
(REH), became the standard for modeling macroeconomic expectations, and has remained the driving representation in macroeconomic research and modeling to date.
5

In a deterministic model, REH can be simply stated:

xe(t+1) + g(t+1) = x(t+1)

Powerful and mathematically elegant, REH led to significant developments in economic theory and understanding. Under this framework, a “rational” agent has perfect
understanding of the underlying laws of motion of an economic system, allowing each
agent to have a near complete view of the systems evolution. Only random economic
shocks, represented by g above, are outside of the pool of knowledge available to a rational agent. Random shocks are events outside of market interaction which can have
an impact on growth or inflation, such as fluctuations in oil prices or natural disasters.
However, REH is built on several assumptions, some of which are too strong to be
accurate to reality. Chief among these is the assumption that rational agents have
knowledge of all exogenous variables present in the economy’s laws of motion, values
which scientists and industry professional must research thoroughly to even hypothesize. Furthermore, REH assumes that all agents are likeminded in their analysis of the
macroeconomy and make identical forecasts of the future.
More recently, researchers have been pursuing a new method of expectation representation, known as adaptive learning, or simply “learning.” Under this set of assumptions, an economic agent is believed to gain knowledge of the laws of motion over
time, becoming more able to accurately forecast as they gather more experience. No
singular means of representing learning has been developed, and so learning theorists
have worked through experimentation to find models and trends that match how human subjects predict, perform, and adjust in economic simulation . This paper follows
the work of other researchers who have created simulations of pricing models, but instead applies these simulation theories and methods to a macroeconomic framework. It
builds on the Honors research of Mr. Atticus Graven ’14, but delves into more realistic
economic representation by gathering data from a multiple-agent economy, rather than
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many single-agent systems.
This paper seeks to explore various possible models of adaptive learning. By gathering data using a forecasting ”game” in a simulated economy, the paper establishes a
set of data to capture how subjects use their knowledge of prior outcomes to predict
economic changes. Once this data set is collected, seven theoretical models of learning
are tested against it to find patterns of fit and relative strength. While much discussion of various rules exists in the literature, relatively little directly tests experimental
data against instictive learning processes. In not setting or prepping subjects in how
directly to think about problems, the research allows for testing a sample of individuals
to see if any single theoretical model proves most effective in representing expectations.
Through the course of the experiment, there is a degree of inconsistency among the
data, but some definitive trends appear in how the subjects may form expectations as
a group.
This paper will first present relevant literature to adaptive learning. Next, it will
discuss and explain the laws of motion used in the generation of the simulated economy,
as well as provided an explanation of the experimental design. Afterwords will follow
an explanation of the theoretical learning rules being tested against the experiental
data, and the statistical outcomes of those rule tests. A discussion of the results and
their implications will follow, with suggestions of improvements for future experiments
with regards to consistency in the data set.

2

Literature Review

There has been a growing consensus among economists that REH contains assumptions that are too powerful to accurately represent society, as actual economic agents
cannot maintain the level of information necessary to form perfectly rational predictions. The complexity of this problem is addressed in Arthur (1992), who suggests the
problems reach a level of complexity after which computational and deductive solu7

tions are impossible to find. Arthur argues that these questions beyond the “Problem
Complexity Boundary” must therefore be solve inductively, drawing on prior knowledge and applying it to a current issue. This form of problem solving has been used
mathematically for many years, and can be represented formulaically. Arthur further
suggests that this form of reasoning could be tested and specified using experimental
methods, which have since been employed in forecasting research.
Forecasting models in expectation formation follow a significant form throughout
research. They are generally set up as a forecasting “game,” in which subjects are
given some set of information about the economic system. Based on the provided
information, each subject is asked to forecast the value of some endogenous variable in
the next time period. These forecasted values are then used to generate an “expectation
value,” which is input into a system of equations to calculate the actualized values of
the variable given the input expectations. Subjects are presented with the new period’s
data, and are asked to forecast again with the new information. This process continues
for a given number of periods, and often subjects are compensated based on their
prediction accuracy.
Many examinations of expectation formation have developed through asset pricing
systems, wherein subjects attempt to predict the value of some tradable good. Marimon
and Sunder (1993) created a test environment in which subjects spent some periods
engaged in trading goods, and other times outside the transactions focused on price
prediction. Again, prices were shown to deviate from rational equilibrium, with more
consistent with adaptive learning as a behavioral basis. Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra
and van de Velden (2005) took a more classic example of such a model, using subjects
with information of dividend values and interest rates to predict the value of a good
against several pre-programmed, “fundamentalist” traders which always predicted a
rational price. This test found that, in general, simple adaptive learning rules were
more effective than the REH in determining price levels of the asset. This paper,
while it targets similar goals of analyzing expectation formation, approaches the issue
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through a macroeconomic framework. This is done to eliminate the aspects of dividend
payments and other extraneous factors, and instead focus on the expectation values
assumed in the Dynamic Schocastic Equilibrium (DSGE) models which have become
a central instrument of macroeconomic theory. Many of these models assume REH
subjects as a foundational aspect of their equilibria (Woodford 2003), but the validity
of such restricting ideas fails to support recent empirical evidence. By tackling these
models directly, this paper hopes to find some evidence to match macroeconomic theory
with more recent empirical findings.
The macroeconomic forecasting model this paper uses is based in part on the work
of Graven (2014), but varies from his work and other literature most notably in the
difference in size of experimental economies. Graven (2014) relied on single-subject
economy data, allowing each participant total control of the expectation terms of their
system. While beneficial for his focus on parameter estimation within the system, this
paper hopes to generate data more accurate to an existing economy, and thus ran tests
in a multi-subject system. Furthermore, the test groups of the experiments presented
here (numbering thirteen subjects and nine, respectively) are larger groups than both
Hommes et al. (2005), which used forecast groups of six, and Marimon and Sunder
(1993), with four forecasters. By enlarging the number of participants, the relevant
weight of each expectation on the economy was lessoned, allowing for a more realistic
model.

9

3

Experimental Design and Model

3.1

NK Model and Parameters

In order to test the various possible adaptive learning models, a forecasting ”game” was
developed. This ”game” simulated an economy using a New-Kenysian (NK) system
of equations to represent the economic laws of motion. Full details of the particular model and foundations can be found in Woodford (2003). The monetary policy
rule was used for capturing expectations previously in Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes
and Massaro (2013). This Dynamic Schocastic Equilibrium (DSGE) Model is built
on micro-foundations of representative agents which are fully utility-maximizing and
firm-maximizing representative firms, and was previously used in Graven (2014). The
model’s laws of motion can be displayed as follows:

e
xt = xet+1 − φ(it − πt+1
) + gt
e
πt = βπt+1
+ λxt + ut

it = π̄ + θπ (πt − π̄) + εt

where gt , ut , εt are autocorrelated error terms of the form:

gt = δgt−1 + g̃t
ut = µut−1 + ũt

and g̃t and ũt are stochastic error terms of mean 0 and standard deviation of 0.2.
These laws of motion are used to systematically replicate the standard business
cycle. They are based around three endogenous variables: xt , πt , and it .
• xt is the output gap. This is the standardized measure between the actual
Gross Domestic Product (GDP, or ”output”) and its calculated natural value.
10

The natural value is generated assuming total employment and full production
in a given year. A positive value indicates that the economy has generated more
output than the natural value, while a negative value indicates worse than natural
productivity. The equation above states that the output gap in period t is based
on expectations of the output gap in period t + 1, the expected inflation rate,
and the interest rate. Expectations of both the output gap and the interest
rate are positively correlated with actual output. The interest rate is negatively
correlated.
• πt is the inflation rate, which measures the percentage change in price levels
across the economy. Each period’s inflation is based on inflation expectations and
the period’s output gap. There is a positive relationship between the expectations
of both output and inflation expectations with the actual inflation rate.
• it is the interest rate, which measures the cost of borrowing money. It is
influenced by a central bank, such as the United States’ Federal Reserve through
the use of the federal funds rate.

In each of these instances, the related random shocks can either positively or negatively
impact the variables. This model assumes a two-period information lag in expectation
formation. That is, subjects form expectations for period t + 1 based on information
from period t − 1.
The model also includes the following parameters:
• φ: The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. This is a representation of how
spending changes based on the expected interest rate. A higher φ indicates
that subjects are more sensitive to rising prices. For the purpose of this model,
φ = 6.369.
• β: The global discount factor. The value is always between 0 and 1, and in this
case the value was set as β = 0.99.
11

• θπ is the interest’s rates responsiveness to inflation. In this instance θπ = 1
• λ is the slope of the Phillips curve, which indicates the relationship between
inflation and the unemployment rate. It is used here to represent the impact
that increases in productivity through employment impact the inflation rate.
This paper assumes λ = 0.3

3.2

Experimental Design

Two separate iterations of the experiment were run, one with 13 subjects and another
with 9. In both instances, the subjects logged into a web browser as unique users on
their college-issued laptops. Experimenters discussed the goals of the experiment, the
normal bounds of the output gap and inflation rate, and were informed of the compensation process. It was particularly noted that compensation would vary depending on
accuracy of responses, and that there would be a random selection between inflation
and output error for each user to ensure they were incentivised to accurately forecast
both variables. The autocorrelated shocks were randomly generated in MATLAB 2012;
subjects were not informed of the degree of the shocks. Each was presented with an
initial actual output gap and inflation value. From these values and based on elementary information on the relative influences of output and inflation on one another,
each subject was asked to forecast the next period’s output and inflation values. The
subjects were not provided any view or progress of the interest rate, though they were
informed that interest rates were involved in the calculation of the model. The values
of the subjects were then averaged into a single expected inflation and expected output
gap value. This is one of the primary differences between this experiment and Graven
(2014). The use of aggregated values to create an economic system allows for a more
representative economy than a single-subject system. The average value was used as
the expectation terms in the model, and from these values actual output and inflation
were calculated by the program. These values were then added to a graphic and chart,
12

and were in turn used to calculate the follow period’s actual values. You can see an example frame from the program showing information in Figure 1. This iterative process
continued for 45 periods in Experiment 1, and 60 periods in Experiment 2.

Figure 1: Sample game screen. Reproduced from Graven (2014).

4
4.1

Results
Description of Learning Rules

There are several potential learning models that have been explored in prior research.
The descriptions set down in Table 1 are a selection of potential rules, adapted from
Pfajfar and Zakelji (2013). Output and Inflation equations are formatted identically,
13

with all occurences of x replaced with π and vice versa. The only exception to this
rule is (6) and (7), for which the independent variables stay matched to the title of the
equation. Each model is a distinct pattern of learning expression, and exist theoretically
as follows:

• The autoregressive process (1) is one of the simplest hypotheses of adaptive learning, which suggests that expectations of future periods are based on the expectations of prior periods. This is an AR-1 model, meaning that only the most recent
period of expectations are used in the generating of the equation.
• The sticky information method (2) assumes that otherwise rational-acting agents
retain some knowledge of their previous expectation formations. This information
is a convex combination of prior expectations and the REH, with λ1 representing
the weight given to the prior period’s rational solution, and 1 − λ1 providing the
weight of the prior expectations.
• The ”true” adaptive learning model of this set, (3) assumes a constant gain rate
of learning, represented by γ. This variable demonstrates the degree to which
the subject uses the variance of her last expectation from the actual value to
inform her expectation formation. Additionally, this rule suppresses a constant
value, suggesting that all of the weight of the decision falls within the weight of
the prior actual and expected values.
• A standard trend extrapolation model such as (4) suggests that subjects assume
that the endogenous variable follows a continuing pattern, which she attempts to
infer from the previous two periods of actual data.
• Equations (5), (6), and (7) exist as a series of models that allow for a comparative analysis. (5) is designed as a model to capture the use of all available
lagged exogenous variables in decision making. (6) and (7) provide an alternative
benchmark in which only output or inflation is considered.
14

Learning Rule
(1): Autoregressive Process (π)
(1): Autoregressive Process (Output)
(2): Sticky Information (π)
(2): Sticky Information (Output)
(3): Adaptive CG Learning (π)
(3): Adaptive CG Learning (Output)
(4): Trend Extrapolation (π)
(4): Trend Extrapolation (Output)
(5): General Model (π)
(5): General Model (Output)
(6): Lagged Output (π)
(6): Lagged Output (Output)
(7): Lagged Inflation (π)
(7): Lagged Inflation (Output)

Model
e
e
πt+1
= β0 + β1 πt|t−1
xet+1 = β0 + β1 xet|t−1
e
e
πt+1
= λ1 β0 + λ1 β1 xt−1 + β2 πt−1 + (1 − λ1 )πt|t−1
xet+1 = λ1 β0 + λ1 β1 πt−1 + β2 xt−1 + (1 − λ1 )xet|t−1
e
e
e
πt+1
= πt−1|t−2
+ γ(πt−1 − πt−1|t−2
)
e
e
e
xt+1 = xt−1|t−2 + γ(xt−1 − xt−1|t−2 )
e
πt+1
= β0 + πt−1 + β1 (πt−1 − πt−2 )
e
xt+1 = β0 + xt−1 + β1 (xt−1 − xt−2 )
e
πt+1
= β0 + β1 πt−1 + β2 xt−1
e
xt+1 = β0 + β1 xt−1 + β2 πt−1
e
πt+1
= β0 + β1 xt−1
e
xt+1 = β0 + β1 xt−1
e
πt+1
= β0 + β1 πt−1
e
xt+1 = β0 + β1 πt−1

Table 1: Potential learning rules, specified for inflation

Two of the models presented here deviate from those presented in Pfajfar and Zakelji
(2013). (2) has been adapted to include knowledge of the lagged inflation term. A
simple learning rule was judged to be too similar to (1) for the sake of this experiment,
so a rational representation other than the MSV was generated to provide additional
insight. In (5), the interest rate value was removed from the general model, since
unlike in Pfaifar’s experiment, subjects of this experiment were not exposed to the
interest rate, and thus not able to factor its value into their decision-making. Each of
these models provides a potential explanation for how subjects may form expectations.
In addition, by comparing the relative strength of models to one another, potential
trends or theoretical tests can be checked to form a fuller idea of how historic data is
processed.

4.2

Statistical Analysis

The set of models discussed in the previous section were all analyzed using MLE regression analysis. Relative effectiveness of each model was evaluated through calculation
of AIC terms for each model, with the lowest AIC value representing the most effec15

tive fit to the data. In order to compare models, the first three user input periods
were dropped from every model to compensate the additional lagged terms used in (3)
and (4). Summarized information is contained in Table 2 for inflation and Table 3 for
output. Tables for each regression can be found in Appendix 2.
In evaluation of the various models, it is clear that several outcomes do not reflect
the theoretical framework in which the regression analyses were created. In (3A) an
impossible gain parameter is observed, as γ is larger than 1. As a gain parameter is
designed to reflect the weight an agent gives to their previous estimation error, it is
expected that this value should appear as an percentage term. While the model passes
the linear restriction existing to ensure that the coefficient values sum to 1, a negative
coefficient falls outside the reasonable values of the theoretical design. In (4) a similar
issue is observed with the generation of the coefficients. In order for the regression
analysis to accurately represent the theory of a constant gain learning model, the
coefficients of the first and second lagged terms should be expected to have coefficents
of 1 + β1 and −β1 , respectively. This linear restriction held for neither inflation nor
output in either test group. Both of these models, therefore, are not found to be
accurate representations of how expectations are formed among these groups. The most
clearly representative model of this set, (2), also displays some degree of inconsistency
within the testing. It held the best AIC numbers in three of the four test sets, and was
the second most accurate model in the remaining value. However, the inflation test
of experiment 1 contains an insignificant expectations term, which would suggest that
rational expectations were more consistent with the regression, which doesn’t match
the results of the other tests in general, and not (2) in particular.
Other models followed theoretical understanding to a degree sufficient for further
analysis. (1) suggested a positive relationship between lagged expectations and current
expectations in each test, which refutes the suggestion of (2A)’s inflation result that
rational expectations were insignificant. However, in general the autoregressive model
was consistently one of the least effective models, suggesting that subjects were aware
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Exp. 1/Rule
Theory
AIC
AIC Order

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
χ
2115.164 2022.674 2025.866 2023.558
F
B
E
D

(5)
χ
2020.78
A

(6)
χ
2133.389
G

(7)
χ
2022.827
C

Exp. 2/Rule (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Theory
χ
χ
χ
χ
AIC
902.2884 670.6455 809.126 809.9863 824.325 1520.314 823.2568
AIC Order
F
A
B
C
E
G
D
Note: A χ indicates that the analysis is comparable to current economic theory, and is thus
usable. The AIC Order provides clarification on the relative accuracy of the model, with A
being the most accurate and G being the least.
Table 2: Inflation test summary across both experiments

Exp. 1/Rule
Theory
AIC
AIC Order

(1)
χ
3525.75
F

(2)
(3)
(4)
χ
3097.738 3142.431 3143.534
A
C
D

(5)
χ
3140.239
B

(6)
χ
3143.206
E

(7)
χ
4260.126
G

Exp. 2/Rule (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Theory
χ
χ
χ
χ
χ
AIC
3531.238 3130.557 3152.654 3142.858 3141.394 3148.032 4055.597
AIC Order
F
A
E
C
B
D
G
Note: A χ indicates that the analysis is comparable to current economic theory, and is thus
usable. The AIC Order provides clarification on the relative accuracy of the model, with A
being the most accurate and G being the least.
Table 3: Output test summary across both experiments
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of more than their former expectations when creating their forecasts.
Besides (2A) Inflation, (2) was consistently the most effective learning rule. Building
on the information suggested from (1) and compared to the relative success in relation
to (5), the data presented seems to indicate that there subjects used both expectations
and lagged endogenous variables in their decision making, and thus used all information
available to them in forecasting process. By the sticky information model we can also
observed the suggested weight between prior expectations and previous actualized data.
Model (2B) of inflation suggests that nearly half of the weight of the decision was based
on prior expectations, but the lack of consistency with (2A) calls into question the
overall validity of that observation. However, both output analyses suggested a greater
weighting towards prior actualized values, with λ = 0.7 and λ = 0.85, respectively,
where λ is the weighted average of these values. It is also interesting to note that
both output tables suggest a negative correlation between prior inflation and expected
output, which connects with the theoretical understanding of the Phillips Curve.
In our final tests we observe more specific relationships between the actualized terms
of the model. It is clear from AIC values that the general model is one of the best
rules empirically for every model except (5B) Inflation. It is worth noting that of these
four analyses, (5B) Inflation was also the only test in which both output and inflation
were not significant, with lagged output values not being an indicator of the expected
inflation changes. On another note, the coefficients of the regressions respond to the
presence of fuller information in the way macroeconomic theory suggests they should.
In the case of (2A) inflation, the value of the prior inflation coefficient is greater in (5)
than in (7), suggesting that subjects place greater value on the prior inflation value
when they are synthesizing information to make predictions, rather than relying on a
more naı̈ve approach. Furthermore, in both of (5)’s output analyses, prior output is
seen to have lower values when considered with prior inflation, as compared to being
observed alone as in (6). This supports the assumption that subjects understand the
contemporaneous relationship between higher inflation and lower output, and carry
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that expectation through their forecasts.

4.3

Discussion

While the data presents several insights into the potential learning rules of the subjects,
there is a fair degree of inconsistency within the analyses. While the most effective
models (2) and (5) tend to follow observable trends, each possesses a test which does
not follow economic theory. Furthermore, these anomalies do not occur in the same
experiment groups, which decreases the likelihood that the differences are due to an experimental anomaly. There are several factors which may have led to these inconsistent
data. The constraints of the program limited the number of subjects of the experiment;
larger data sets than those presented here were attempted, but ended prematurely due
to user errors which led to server failures for the game. A larger sample size may
have provided more defined separations between closely linked rules, as well as greater
clarity to what occur in the inconsistent analyses. Model design may also have led to
unususal outcomes. While not of direct impact to this analysis, unusual spikes in both
output and inflation occured during the testing period, which may have limited the
ability of the subjects to settle fully into a consistent, natural pattern of expectation
formation. It is possible that these spikes were a result of the overweighting of shocks
within the model, but further analysis of the laws of motion needs to be explored to
ensure the stability of the DSGE setting under these conditions.
Furthermore, it is possible that there is not a single learning rule that all subjects
follow. Differences in learning methods have some historic support in research, and
would support a claim that learning follows is ingrained more as a desire that an
iterative process. Heterogeneous decision-making on the subject level could lead to inconsistencies in aggregation. The idea of heterogeneous learning is discussed in Pfajfar
and Zakelji (2013) and Hommes et al. (2005), and would be more effectively tested in
a single-agent economy, or on a subject basis. Further iterations of this study could
explore this subject further, but such an analysis falls outside the bounds of this paper.
19

5

Conclusion

This experiment was generated with the goal of examining potential learning models
in an experimental setting to test their practical validity. While several trends appeared within the design, a definitive representation of expectation formation remains
enigmatic. Evidence suggests that subjects favor actualized values over their prior expectations, and some analyses suggest that subjects are considering the relationship
between endogenous variables, while others are not. The tests pressent evidence that
the subjects of these test leaned towards a trend extrapolation rule, but the model
presented in this paper is insufficient to represent their method.

20

References
Arthur, Brian, On Learning and Adaptation in the Economy, Kingston, Ont.: Queens
University, December 1992.
Assenza, Tiziana, Peter Heemeijer, Cars Hommes, and Domenico Massaro,
“Individual Expectations and Aggregate Macro Behavior,” February 2013.
Graven, Atticus David Holm, “Experimental Evidence for Heterogeneous Expectations in a Simle New Keynesian Framework,” apr 2014.
Hommes, Cars, J Sonnemans, J Tuinstra, and Henk van de Velden, “Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments,” Review of Financial
Studies, September 2005, 18 (3), 1–45.
Lucas, R E, “Adjustment costs and the theory of supply,” The Journal of Political
Economy, 1967, 75 (4), 321–334.
Marimon, Ramon and Shyam Sunder, “Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica, 1993, 61 (5), 1073–
1107.
Muth, J F, “Rational expectations and the theory of price movements,” Econometrica,
1961, 29 (3), 315–335.
Pfajfar, Damjan and Blaz Zakelji, “Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy
Design: Evidence from the Laboratory,” mimeo, Tilburg University, March 2013.
Woodford, Michael, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary
Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

21

6

Appendix 1: Compensation Schedule

This compensation method adapted from Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra and van de
Velden (2005) and Graven (2014)
Each subject received $5 for participating in the program, and were told that, on
average, each subject could expect to receive $15 based on their performance. It was
also made clear that the compensation would be based on the error of one of their two
forecasted values, selected at random. This design was to incentivise the subjects to
attempt to accurately predict both variables to the best of their ability in each period.
The formula is point-based, with each subject receiving a number of points each period
based on the squared error of their expectation from the actual value of the period.
Previous work suggests that inflation rates are easier to predict than output(see Graven
(2014)), so an exchange rate was established to create a $15 average return independent
of which endogenous variable is selected. The exchange rates for inflation and output,
respectively, are:
ρπ = 4, 900 points / dollar
ρx = 600 points / dollar
Using this point system, earnings were calculated based on a maximization equation.
Let vi be the the output gap x or the inflation rate π for subject i. Then, vit is that
variable in period t, and v e is the ith subject’s prediction for that variable in period t.
eit = max(2000 −

2000
[(v − vite )]2 , 0)
0.156

Then, eit is the point earnings in period t of subject i. The total earnings of i can be
written:
ΣTt=0 (eit )
ρi
Where T is the total number of periods, and ρi is the variable’s rate of exchange. In
the case of this experiment, T = 45 for Experiment 1, and T = 60 for Experiment 2.
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Appendix 2: Regression Models
Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (1) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (2) — Experiment 2
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Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (3) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (4) — Experiment 2
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Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (5) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (6) — Experiment 2
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Experiment 1 — Inflation Learning Rule (7) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (1) — Experiment 2
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Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (2) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (3) — Experiment 2
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Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (4) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (5) — Experiment 2

28

Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (6) — Experiment 2

Experiment 1 — Output Learning Rule (7) — Experiment 2
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